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COMMENTS
GIVE US SOVEREIGNTY OR GIVE US
DEBT: DEBTOR COUNTRIES'
PERSPECTIVE ON DEBT-FOR-
NATURE SWAPS
PRIYA ALAGIRI
INTRODUCTION
It is clearly recognized that developing countries (DCs) are exper-
iencing a debt crisis.' Beginning in the mid-1970s, bad lending and
1. See Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity for Change: A Comment on. the Debt Restructuring
Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 613, 614 (1985) (stating that Mexico's "standstill an-
nouncement" of August 1982, declaring that it could not meet quarterly debt interest pay-
ment to its creditor bank, was signal to world that crisis had begun); Bramble, Third World Debt
& Natural Resource Conservation: Tragedy & Opportunity (available from National Wildlife Federa-
tion, Washington, D.C.), June 15, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter Bramble, Third World Debt] (explain-
ing that debt was quietly building for years before it became crisis in 1982). Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Venezuela, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines account for the majority
of debt owed to the United States. Moran, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: U.S. Policy Issues and Options,
RENEWABLE RESOURCESJ., Spring 1991, at 20-22, reprinted in 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. E1264 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991). Latin America, however, is the most indebted of all
debtor regions. Potier, Swapping Debt for Nature, OECD OBSERVER, Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 17;
Bramble, Third World Debt and Natural Resources Conservation (available from National Wildlife
Federation, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1986, at 1 (stating Latin America owes majority of all
developing country (DC) debt). See generally S.J. Res. 101, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (introduced by Sen. Chafee) (stating Brazil is burdened
with $130 billion debt and consequently its citizens are facing squalid living conditions).
A debt crisis results when DC governments have an insufficient reserve of foreign currency
to make foreign currency payments to creditors. See Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign
Debt: An Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 401 (stating that sovereign debt crisis results
when inflow of foreign exchange into DC is insufficient to cover country's payments in foreign
currency). DCs must pay creditors in the creditor country's currency. Comment, The Debt-for-
Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 Ir'L L.
1071, 1073 n.14 (1990). Therefore, a DC government cannot pay its foreign debt unless it
has an inflow of foreign currency, which usually comes from the sale of DC exports. Id. If
countries could pay their debt in local currency, however, the debt crisis would most likely
disappear. Buchheit, supra, at 401.
Debtor countries, for the purpose of debt-for-nature swaps, are the countries having large
outstanding debts or having greatly discounted debts in the debt market. See Comment, Debt-
for-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future, 6J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 319, 340 (1990) (stating
debt-for-nature swaps only take place with heavily indebted countries); infra notes 16-24 and
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borrowing decisions, skyrocketing interest rates, and deteriorating
terms of trade for their chief exports engendered a dramatic in-
crease in the external debt of DCs.2 Today, in an attempt to settle
the debt, DCs "borrow" from their natural resources by employing
indiscriminate short-term solutions designed to increase export
profits.3 Unfortunately, quick-fix solutions, such as clearing forests
for farming, mining, and lumber, pillage tropical rainforests, wet-
lands, and grasslands, and produce emasculating effects on this eco-
logically vital corner of the world.4 In fact, DCs are depleting
accompanying text (describing discounted debt market and entitled secondary market, which
are used for debt exchange programs).
2. See Bramble, External Debt, Democratization, and Natural Resources in Developing Countries:
The Case of Brazil (available from National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.), 1989, at 1
[hereinafter Bramble, External Debt] (discussing causes of debt and economic burdens related
to servicing debt); Bogdanowicz, Third World Debt: An Analysis (available from World Wildlife
Fund, Washington, D.C.), 1988, at I (discussing causes of external debt); Bramble, U.S. Con-
gressional Summit on an Economic Agenda for the 1990's (available from National Wildlife Federa-
tion, Washington, D.C.), 1987, at 1 [hereinafter Bramble, U.S. Congressional Summit] (noting
DCs' debt service requirements).
Skyrocketing oil prices and interest rates of the late 1970s, combined with a recession in
most industrialized nations in the early 1980s, precipitated the international debt crisis.
Bramble, Third World Debt, supra note 1, at 2. In 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) raised its prices by 4007o. Comment, supra note 1, at 1072 (discussing
history of debt crisis). Because of the price increase, DCs could only pay for oil with the
assistance of foreign loans. Id. The money loaned to DCs were OPEC profits deposited in
commercial banks. Id. The banks benefitted by charging greater interest rates to poorer
countries. Id. In 1979, OPEC again raised its oil prices and DCs consequently needed to take
out larger loans having greater interest rates. Id. Because the debt became insurmountable
for DCs, banks restructured the debt with increased interest rates. Id. DCs could not, how-
ever, produce enough exports to meet the payments. Id. Banks finally accepted the reality
that DCs may not ever service all of their debt. Id. Consequently, alternative measures for
reducing debt emerged as banks searched for ways to minimize their debt losses. Id.
The origins of the 1982 crisis in developing countries are consequently attributable to four
factors: (1) the first oil price shock in 1973 and its aftermath; (2) the second oil price shock in
1979; (3) the protracted global recession of 1981-83, distinguished by unprecedented high
interest rates and growing protectionism in industrialized countries' raw material exports; and
(4) the repercussions caused by the response of international credit markets to the Mexican
liquidity crisis of August 1982. Note, Experimenting With Orthodox Economics in Brazi- An Analysis
of the Socioeconomic Effects of Adjustment During 1982-1984, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 651, 653
(1985).
For a description of how DCs view their debt problem, see generally, Amaral, The Debt Crisis
from the Point of View of a Debtor Country, 17 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 633 (1985) (describing
DCs' debt readjustment processes, debt characteristics, and medium-term prospects of debt
crisis).
3. See Bramble, Third World Debt, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that debt crisis and need to
increase short-term economic productivity forces DCs to accelerate exploitation of natural
resources); Note, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable, 22 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L.
141, 151 (1990) (explaining most countries take on short-term development projects to try to
alleviate some economic problems); Comment, supra note 1, at 1071 (stating DCs indiscrimi-
nately cut down trees to increase export revenue and borrow from lending institutions and
natural resources to service their debts). But see Shabecoff, Bolivia To Protect Lands in Swap for
Lower Debt, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1987, at C2, col. 2 (reporting Bolivia's agreement not to
develop millions of acres of rain forest in exchange for debt reduction).
4. See Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting Environmental Interests
in Developing Nations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1065, 1066 (1989) (discussing result of unrestrained
development of natural resources in DCs). The threats of these quick-fix solutions include
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tropical rain forests at a rate of one and one-half acres per second. 5
If this rate of destruction continues, in twenty years DCs will largely
strip their tropical forests bare.6
This consequence would be calamitous. Deforestation threatens
one-half of the earth's life forms, including thousands of indigenous
groups living off the forests. 7 These groups depend on the forest
for fuel, cooking, energy, and medicine.8 Deforestation would con-
sequently impoverish approximately one billion people.9 Deforesta-
tion also influences global climate patterns by raising temperatures
and lowering rainfall in areas once richly forested.' 0 Furthermore,
deforestation causes increased emissions of carbon dioxide, a lead-
ing contributor to the greenhouse effect." Unless alternate meas-
ures to reduce debt emerge, deforestation and the resulting dire
consequences will continue because servicing debt with "environ-
mental loans," rather than high-interest commercial loans, is more
economical for DCs.' 2
Debt-for-nature swaps arose as a dignified solution to developing
countries' debt and environmental problems.' 3 The global commu-
massive deforestation, extinction of valuable species of plants and animals, erosion of soil,
deterioration of downstream water supplies, reduction of fishery potential, and destruction of
valuable wetlands. Bramble, External Debt, supra note 2, at 1.
5. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1075 (noting World Resources Institute report that
tropical rain forests equal in size to State of Washington are destroyed annually).
6. See Copeland, Buying Debt, Saving Nature, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 45 (stating
countless species of plants and animals will die in "the greatest extinction since the end of the
age of the dinosaurs") (quoting Harvard Biologist E.O. Wilson). Loss of tropical forests may
lead to extinction of millions of plants and animals not yet identified or studied for their
potential use for agriculture, medicine, or industry. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, INTER-
NATIONAL PROGRAM 1 (undated). The tropical forest is a "[g]enetic library for all our future
expectations of biotechnology, storehouse of half the overall species of plants and animals,
moderator of regional climate, [and a] sponge that holds more than twenty-five percent of
world's fresh water supply." Bramble, U.S. Congressional Summit, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Dawkins, Debt-for-Nature Swaps (available from Dep't of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.) (undated), at 1.
8. Moran, supra note 1, at 20-22, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1264 (discussing social
and environmental impacts of debt and deforestation); Fuller & Williamson, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation in Developing Nations, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
149, at 301 (May 11, 1988) (discussing DCs' dependence on tropical forests for everyday
needs).
9. Moran, supra note 1, at 20-22, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1264.
10. Comment, supra note 4, at 1066 (discussing spectrum of consequences of
deforestation).
11. See New President Appoints Ecologist to Head Environmental Secretariat, 13 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 152 (Apr. 11, 1990) (discussing carbon dioxide problem in Brazil); Dawkins,
supra note 7, at I (stating that in 1980, tropical deforestation accounted for 26% of world
carbon dioxide emissions, leading greenhouse gas).
12. Comment, supra note 1, at 1071 (stating environmental loans are more attractive
than bank loans because environmental loans come interest-free).
13. See Note, supra note 3, at 154 (claiming debt-for-nature swaps are more appealing
than political concessions for resolution of debt crisis). Dr. Thomas Lovejoy first proposed
debt-for-nature swaps. Fuller & Williamson, supra note 8, at 301. In 1984, he proposed con-
verting international debt into support for conservation because programs to manage natural
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nity has received the concept with enthusiasm. Positive reaction
will dissipate, however, if inherent problems, particularly negative
perceptions of debt-for-nature swaps within DCs themselves, are
not remedied.14 This Comment examines whether debt-for-nature
swaps, in their present form, provide a viable solution to the steadily
deteriorating economic and environmental conditions in DCs. 15
This Comment particularly illustrates how DC governments and
their indigenous people perceive debt-for-nature swaps as en-
croachments upon their sovereignty. Sovereignty anxieties exist on
the forefront of debt-for-nature transactions, and if future transac-
tions are to succeed, debt-for-nature swaps must alleviate these
anxieties.
Part I of this Comment examines the general nature of debt ex-
changes. Part II explains the debt-for-nature swap concept and de-
resources were the first slashed by governments struggling to pay off debts. Id. As a result,
Lovejoy proposed using the debt crisis positively to help solve environmental problems. Id.;
see also infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (defining debt-for-nature swaps as those tran-
sactons where environmental organizations exchange DC debt for DC conservation meas-
ures).
Prior to implementing debt-for-nature swaps, creditors utilized debt management tech-
niques which quickly became antiquated. See Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 371 (stating debt management techniques, soon after
implementation, became labeled as conventional and obsolete). These conventional tech-
niques followed similar frameworks which commentators describe as over-simplified. Id. at
371-72. Buchheit lists the major features found in Latin American debt restructuring tech-
niques. Id. at 372. First, the principal amount owed is rescheduled over a specific term be-
cause DCs are unable to pay due to a standstill on the payment of foreign currency. Second,
interest is paid on a timely basis. Finally, the interest rate is often raised due to overall re-
structuring. Id. at 373. Banks repeat these measures as often as necessary to improve the
situation. Id. One of the reasons debt-for-nature swaps arose was because these conventional
techniques were ineffective in combatting the debt problem. Id. at 373.
14. See Bramble, Third World Debt, supra note 1, at 6-7 (stating DCs must resolve question
of whether debt-for-nature swaps represent unnecessary intrusion on sovereign rights); Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 340 (stating there are many factors working against debt-for-nature
swaps, such as resistance from banks and DC governments); 136 CONG. REc. E2857 (daily ed.
Sept. 14, 1990) (reprinting Caldwell, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Are They Really a Viable Solution[hereinafter Caldwell] (stating that issue of national sovereignty is often raised in debt-for-
nature swap transactions)); Cody, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Developing Countries: An Overview of
Recent Conservation Efforts, Rep. No. 88-647 ENR (available from Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 26, 1988, at 22-23 (arguing both sides of whether debt-for-
nature swaps infringe on DC sovereignty); Barton, Debt Swaps: New Game in Town, CHRISTIAN-
rry & CRISIS, Mar. 7, 1988, at 62 (renouncing debt-for-nature swaps because it places DC
sovereignty at stake); Fuller & Williamson, supra note 8, at 301 (stating that environmental
community greeted these swaps with skepticism); see also Note, supra note 3, at 154 (stating
that amount of debt canceled in Bolivian debt-for-nature swap is relatively small and could be
considered insignificant in overall debt picture); Aeppel, Environmental Groups Pioneer "Debt-for-
Nature" Swaps, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 1, 1987, at 1 (stating that in terms of overall
debt, deals like this will not make dent). But see Fuller, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 23 ENVTL. Sci.
TECH. 1450, 1451 (1989) (stating debt-for-nature swaps represent best way to stretch buying
power of all those involved in promoting sustainable use of natural resources and ultimately
results in everyone benefitting).
15. See 136 CONG. REC. E2856-57 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1990) (statement of Rep. McHugh)
(stating debt-for-nature swaps require further examination to determine feasibility).
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scribes paradigmatic swaps in Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
Part III focuses on the sovereignty infringement aspects of debt-for-
nature swaps, utilizing Bolivia and Brazil as examples. Part IV dis-
cusses DCs' general aversion to restrictions on the use of natural
resources imposed by debt-for-nature swaps. Part V proposes that
environmental organizations modify future debt-for-nature swaps to
alleviate the concerns of those affected most directly by these trans-
actions - the indigenous population. Part V also proposes that fu-
ture debt-for-nature swap agreements include sovereignty
protection clauses, developed from the international law concept of
nationalization, to provide a remedy for DC governments' sover-
eignty concerns. This Comment concludes that debt-for-nature
swaps can be an effective solution to the dual debt and environmen-
tal crises provided the sovereignty concerns of all .parties are
resolved.
I. THE DEBT EXCHANGE CONCEPT
In response to stagnating economies in DCs and resulting unpay-
able debt, financial institutions developed secondary markets in
which foreign parties could trade DC debt owed to private banks at
a discount. 16 These markets developed to allow banks to trade
loans among themselves and thereby avoid financially unstable
countries. 17 Today, banks use secondary markets primarily to sell
debt to international organizations for use in debt exchange pro-
grams with DCs.18
16. Gibson & Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 335
(1990) (noting that former President of Fundacion Natura, large conservationist group in Ecua-
dor, originally developed system); see Burton, Debt-for-Development: A New Opportunity for Non-
profits, Commercial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 233, 235 (1990) (stating high
levels of unpaid debt resulted in secondary market's development).
Bankers realized that the cost of allowing DCs to resolve their own debt problems was
greater than the cost to the banks to attempt the same. Id. But see Von Moltke, Debt-for-Nature:
An Overview (available from National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.) (undated), at 1-2
(claiming secondary market is imperfect because covenants ensuring that creditors do not
dispose of debt without other creditors' approval impedes banks from freely selling debt).
The secondary market's growth is steady. In 1986, the World Bank counted approximately
$7 billion in discounted debt sales; by 1987, banks traded $12 billion; and in 1988, the figure
rose to approximately $20 billion. Burton, supra, at 235.
17. See Comment, supra note 1, at 320 n.9 (stating banks developed secondary market to
avoid overexposure to any single unstable economy); Burand & Barton, Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Are Counterproductive, DEv. F.,July-Aug. 1989, at 13 (explaining private banks promoted secon-
dary market to cut their losses on bad debts).
18. Comment, supra note 1, at 320 n.9; see Buchheit, supra note 1, at 401 (stating active
secondary market must exist for sovereign debt trading); Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek,
Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 417 (stating most Latin American and sev-
eral other debtor countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Jamaica, Philippines, and Poland
use market to adopt debt exchange programs).
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Most debt exchange programs utilize secondary markets.19 Typi-
cally, foreign institutions buy DC debt below face value in the secon-
dary market and then sell this discounted debt to DCs at near face
value for DC currency. 20 For example, if the debt's face value is
$200, persons or organizations interested in establishing a debt ex-
change program in a DC would purchase this debt for $50 in the
secondary market.21 Then, these persons or organizations would
sell the debt to the DC for $100 in local currency.22 International
organizations earn a profit from these transactions because the price
at which they sell the debt is greater than the price they pay for the
debt.23 Also, when international organizations buy DC debt, the
amount of outstanding debt on which DCs have to pay interest to
banks is reduced. 24 International organizations use the DC cur-
rency they receive from these transactions to establish businesses or
environmental projects in DCs.2 5
One practical application of the debt exchange concept is the
"debt-equity" swap.26 In this type of transaction, investors buy DC
debt from the secondary market and sell it to the DC in exchange
for local currency. 27 The proceeds are then used to finance business
ventures in DCs. 28 For example, Ford Motor Company (Ford)
19. See supra notes 16-18 & infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (outlining debt ex-
change mechanism).
20. Evans, Seconday Markets: Anomalous But Profitable, EUROMONEY (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT),
Jan. 1988, at 25; see Chamberlin, supra note 18, at 418-19 (explaining debt exchange concept);
Gibson, supra note 16, at 335-86 (detailing hypothetical purchase of debt by financial institu-
tion); Comment, supra note 1, at 1077 (discussing how investors purchase DC debt in secon-
dary market). Creditors can purchase Colombian and Chilean debt at approximately 65% of
face value; Venezuelan and Mexican debt at 40%; Brazilian debt at 21%; and Argentinian
debt at 18%. Id. at 1077; see also Buchheit, Legal Issues in Trading Sovereign Debt, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Feb. 1986, at 17 (discussing various legal issues that may arise in connection with
purchase and sale of sovereign debt, such as amount of time DC will be given to pay off debt
and price which will be paid for debt).
21. Gibson, supra note 16, at 335 (describing similar example explaining debt-for-nature
mechanism).
22. Id; see supra notes 16-21 & infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text (describing debt
exchange mechanism where institutions sell debt to DCs).
23. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 336 (explaining that if foreign organization directly
donated $25 to DC government, they would only have $25 in local currency at current market
exchange rate to use for environmental programs, as opposed to approximately three times
that amount when debt is purchased on secondary market).
24. See Comment, supra note 1, at 320 (stating that reducing debt through secondary
market allows DCs to pay organizations in local currency rather than banks in hard currency).
25. Chamberlin, supra note 18, at 418.
26. Bramble, How Debt Can Be Swapped for Trees (available from National Wildlife Federa-
tion, Washington, D.C.) May, 1990, at 2 (stating debt-equity swaps are often used in secon-
dary market); see infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text (defining debt-equity swaps), Chile
adopted the first legal framework for debt-equity conversions. Note, International Debt: Debt-
To-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 508 (1987). Mexico and the Philippines have also
adopted official debt-equity conversion programs. Id. at 507.
27. Note, supra note 26, at 507.
28. Note, supra note 26, at 507; Burton, supra note 16, at 236; see Comment, supra note 1,
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bought $50 million worth of Mexican debt from the secondary mar-
ket for only $29 million. 29 Ford subsequently sold the debt to the
Mexican government for $43.5 million in local currency.30 With the
local currency, Ford established an assembly plant in Mexico across
the border from Texas to build low cost automobiles for export into
the United States. 3 1 Debt-equity swaps, as illustrated by the Ford
transaction, work to increase foreign ownership of DCs' productive
assets, which ultimately results in the removal of profits from the
DCs.3 2
Although efficient and creative, these transactions are problem-
atic.3 3 One of the most significant problems is that DCs fear the
foreign control of local assets. 34 DCs believe that foreign investors
who own the assets may eventually dictate policies within their
countries.3 5 One critic likened these swaps to automobile reposses-
sion; just as banks repossess cars for late payments, investors appro-
priate DC land for late debt payments.3 6 From a DC's perspective,
at 320 (stating that DCs have exchanged debt for equity holdings in DC); Comment, supra
note 1, at 1077-78 (positing that debt-equity swaps create new capital, thereby expanding
corporate growth and resulting in increase of exports).
29. Barton, supra note 14, at 62.
30. Barton, supra note 14, at 62.
31. Barton, supra note 14, at 62 (using examples of debt-equity swaps, such as Bankers
Trust purchase of Chilean debt to obtain controlling interest in two large financial
organizations).
32. Barton, supra note 14, at 63 (stating DCs trade loan debt for equity debt, defined as
foreign-owned assets, which provide foreign parties with profits); Bramble, supra note 26, at 2
(discussing negative effects of debt-equity swaps and further stating that debt-holders ex-
change debt for ownership of DCs' production assets, eventually taking any subsequent prof-
its out of DCs).
33. See Burton, supra note 16, at 236 (stating that these transactions are especially prob-
lematic for debtor governments). They, however, do possess some advantages. For example,
because debt-equity swaps enable DCs to retire long-term debt, the transactions provide in-
centive for new investment in DCs, leading to better export earnings. Id.
34. Note, supra note 3, at 152 (stating that dissention in participating countries results
from process of giving assets to third parties); Comment, supra note 1, at 1079 (citing Note,
The Federal Reserve Board's "Liberalization" of Restrictions on LDC Debt-Equity Swaps, 20 LAw & POL.
IN'L.Bus. 163, 166 (1988) (suggesting antagonism results from foreign control over coun-
try's "most lucrative investment opportunities")); see Note, supra note 26, at 513 (stating that
considerable domestic political opposition exists to foreign ownership of assets).
There are other problems as well. First, debt-equity swaps place complex restrictions on
foreign enterprises. Buchheit, supra note 13, at 398. Second, exchanging local currency for
debt may result in inflation for the debtor country. Id. Third, DC governments may believe
that they are foregoing fresh foreign investments in the DC that would have occurred even
without a debt renegotiating scheme. Ia Fourth, DC governments may prefer fresh money
investments over converted money. Comment, supra note 1, at 1078-79. Finally, DC govern-
ments also fear local currency devaluation because they may need to produce more local cur-
rency in order to purchase foreign debt. Id.
35. Barton, supra note 14, at 62-63; see Burton, supra note 16, at 237 (stating that debt-
equity's biggest drawback is increased foreign control of DCs' economies).
36. Barton, supra note 14, at 63 (stating debt-for-nature swaps differ from automobile
repossession only by type of domination which occurs).
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therefore, a debt-equity swap would not provide a legitimate solu-
tion to its debtor status.
II. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
Due to the problems with debt-equity swaps, debt-for-nature
swaps evolved as a popular alternative.3 7 Indeed, in response to
years of economic crisis in Latin America, on September 14, 1990,
the President of the United States introduced to Congress the En-
terprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1990 (Initiative Act), a
proposal which largely relies upon debt-for-nature swaps.38 Key
provisions of the bill permit (DCs) to reduce outstanding debt
through investments in environmental reform. 39 The plan provides
for the establishment of an environmental fund into which organiza-
tions dedicated to DC environmental preservation place local cur-
rency payments.40 These payments, in turn are used as grants for
environmental projects and programs. 4 1 Pursuant to the Initiative
37. Comment, Deforestation in Brazil" Domestic Political Imperative-Global Ecological Disaster,
18 EmrL. L. 537, 565 (1988) (stating that debt-for-nature swaps are frequently proposed and
encouraged); see Letter from Barbara Bramble to Members of the National Wildlife Federa-
tion (available from National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 9, 1990 (stating
that since controversy over debt-equity swaps continues, nature organizations should heavily
endorse debt-for-nature swaps); see also infra note 43 (discussing positive congressional re-
sponse to debt-for-nature swaps).
Debt-for-nature opportunities evolved from the debt-equity concept as DCs and private
lenders became frustrated by conventional mechanisms and, as a result, began to consider
unconventional solutions. Fuller & Williamson, supra note 8, at 301; see supra note 13 (describ-
ing previous mechanisms used to reduce debt).
38. S. 3064, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. S13258 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990)
(introduced by Sen. Pell).
39. The debt initiative component of the proposal allows banks to sell debts owed to the
United States Commodity Credit Corporation and Export Import Bank on the secondary mar-
ket in order to fund environmental programs. Id.
The Initiative Act also proposes trade and investment initiatives. Id. The trade initiative
part of the plan proposes to reach agreements with Latin American countries to promote free
trade. Id. The investment initiative proposes to ease restrictions on foreign investment and
promote privatization of government-owned industry. Id.
40. Regional Plan on Debt-for-Nature Swaps to be Presented to United States in March, Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 80 (Feb. 13, 1991) (discussing debt-for-nature programs in Enterprise
for Americas Initiative Act).
41. Id. Before any debt-for-nature transactions occur, the Initiative Act requires coun-
tries to meet strict economic reform guidelines that are set and monitored by international
lending institutions. Moran, supra note 1, at 19, 23, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1265 (dis-
cussing financial incentives for DCs to participate in Enterprise for Americas Initiative Act).
The guidelines state that a country must already have plans to satisfy (1) economic reforms
through the World Bank; (2) economic reforms through the International Monetary Fund; (3)
investment reforms through the Inter-American Development Bank; and (4) debt reduction
programs with commercial bank lenders. Id. If the conditions are met, the United States will
substantially reduce the DC's principal. Id. One criticism of the Initiative Act is that the con-
ditions required for countries to be eligible for debt restructuring are so stringent that they
undermine the credibility of the proposal. See Environmentalists Criticize Aspects of Latin America
Environment-Economic Plan, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 422 (Oct. 10, 1990) (noting objec-
tions by environmental groups to eligibility requirements). There is also criticism that the
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Act, the President boldly proposed to cancel a portion of the $12
billion debt owed to the United States Government by Latin
America. 42 This proposal evidences the growing popularity of so-
called "debt-for-nature swap" programs. 43
Debt-for-nature swaps are mechanisms requiring DC govern-
ments, through their own environmental organizations, to set aside
cofiservation easements to be used only for sustainable develop-
ment projects.44 In exchange, portions of DC governments' debt
legislation is not sensitive to the work of environmental agencies. See id. (ruling for increased
environmental sensitivity in International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies).
42. 136 CONG. REC. E2856-57 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1990) (statement of Rep. McHugh)
(noting President Bush's Initiative Act proposes to cut $12 billion public debt owed to United
States).
43. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of first debt-
for-nature swap in 1987). Members of Congress continue to introduce proposals that support
debt-for-nature swaps. See S. 3064, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S13258 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1990) (introduced by Sen. Pell) (urging sale, reduction, or cancellation of certain
debts owed by eligible countries in order to facilitate debt-for-nature swaps); S. 2364, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3058 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (introduced by Rep. Fascell)
(supporting emergency supplemental assistance for Panama and Nicaragua through use of
debt-for-nature swaps); H.R. 2939, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H8526 (daily ed.
Nov. 11, 1989) (introduced by Rep. Armey) (seeking active implementation of World Bank
pilot debt-for-nature swap programs).
Congress has enacted legislation promoting debt-for-nature swaps. See International Devel-
opment and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, 103 Stat. 2492 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C.A. § 262p-4i (West 1990)) (requiring each multilateral development bank to create
department that will promote and coordinate debt-for-nature swaps); Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513,
104 Stat. 2013 (1990) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2621 (West 1991)) (containing
language directing Treasury Department to promote environmentally sustainable economic
growth through use of multilateral development banks).
The United States Department of Treasury provided further impetus for undertaking debt-
for-nature transactions by issuing Revenue Ruling 87-124. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B.
205. The Ruling permits debt lenders to take a tax deduction equal to their cost basis in the
debt. Id.
44. See Note, supra note 3, at 141-42 (defining debt-for-nature swaps). Conservation
easements restrict land usage in order to protect or preserve the "natural, agricultural, scenic,
or open-space value of the property." Comment, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of
Changed Conditions, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1187, 1187 (1989). An "increasing concern" about the
environment has engendered a proliferation of conservation easements in the last twenty
years. Id. at 1188.
Sustainable development is a means for achieving economic development for the global
economy by meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of
the future generation. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COM-
MON FUTURE 143 (1987). In other words, the present population should satisfy their needs
without destroying the potential of future generations to satisfy their own needs. Id. For
example, the present population should not acquire fuel by cutting down all trees in the
rainforests, thereby precluding future generations from utilizing the rainforests. Id.
Three types of debt may be canceled through debt-for-nature exchanges. One type is
United States commercial bank debt, which the first generation of debt-for-nature swaps used.
Moran, supra note 1, at 20-22, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1264. Commercial bank debt is
sold or donated to environmental organizations on the secondary market to be used for debt-
for-nature swaps. Id. at 21, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1264. Another type of debt is Multi-
lateral Development Bank Debt, which is owed to creditor countries. Id. at 22, reprinted in 137
CONG. REC. E1265. The World Bank and similar multilateral development banks may allow a
country to convert part of its debt into local currency for environmental activities. Id. The
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are canceled. 4 5 By protecting land for the benefit of current and
future generations, the swaps promote long-term solutions to DCs'
debilitating environmental and economic problems. 46
There are five steps to debt-for-nature swaps. Initially, an inter-
national environmental organization must obtain DC approval to es-
tablish a conservation project in the DC.47  Negotiating parties
typically include the DC government, the central bank, and, most
importantly, a private conservation organization in the DC that will
receive the funds and manage the agreed upon program. 48 The in-
ternational organization confers with the DC environmental organi-
zation to determine whether a debt-for-nature swap is suitable
within that DC.49 Second, the international organization obtains the
debt instrument from the secondary market.50 The third step in-
volves the transfer of the debt title to the purchaser of the debt.51
Next, the debt is converted into DC currency in accordance with the
negotiated debt-for-nature agreement.5 2 The final step is to execute
the agreed upon conservation program.53 To date, international
most recent type of debt is bilateral debt owed specifically to the United States. Id. The
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act deals with this type of debt and works by reducing a
Latin American country's debt if that country takes action toward economic, trade, and invest-
ment reform. Id.
45. See Note, supra note 3, at 141-42 (explaining how debt-for-nature swaps function).
46. See generally WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 44,
at 43 (discussing sustainable development in long-term perspective).
47. Von Moltke, supra note 16, at 1.
48. Id. Negotiations cover such issues as the applicable exchange rate for conversion of
the debt to local currency, the conditions of payment, and how DC organizations should
spend the proceeds. Comment, supra note 1, at 1080-81.
49. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 335 (outlining debt-for-nature swap mechanism).
50. Comment, supra note 1, at 1081 (explaining that secondary markets allow purchase
and sale of debt agreements). International organizations obtain the debt instrument from
the secondary market, which establishes the base price for the debt of each country. Id. Mar-
ket prices for the debt vary depending on the country. Id. A lower price may reflect greater
risks. Id. The prices, however, quoted by the secondary market, only represent an estimate as
the prices are subject to fluctuation. Von Moltke, supra note 16, at 2.
International organizations usually receive money to buy debt from fund raising projects.
Id. For example, Conservation International obtained funds from the Frank Weeden Founda-
tion to purchase $650,000 in discounted Bolivian debt. Financing Conservation, IV TROPiCUs,
Fall 1988, at 1.
51. Comment, supra note 1, at 1081. This is a complex transaction. Von Moltke, supra
note 16, at 2. The primary question is which environmental organization will purchase the
debt. Id. Ultimately, the debt may be acquired in one of three ways: (1) the international
organization may buy the debt from the secondary market and simply donate it to the DC
government's environmental organization; (2) the international organization may donate re-
sources to the DC environmental organization to allow it to directly acquire the debt; or (3)
the bank may directly donate the debt to the DC environmental organization, who then acts as
agent for the international organization. Id.
52. Von Moltke, supra note 16, at 2. The debt may be converted to local currency, ex-
changed for local currency bonds, or canceled in exchange for legislative measures to protect
particular areas. Id.
53. Id. (stating that reputation of international organizations can be affected by success
or failure of implementation). These debt-for-nature swaps serve three main purposes: (1)
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
environmental organizations have purchased nearly $100 million of
DC debt for only $16 million, and have completed sixteen debt-for-
nature transactions.54 This Comment summarizes the first three
transactions, which serve as precedent for the other debt-for-nature
swaps. 55
A. Bolivia
In July 1987, Conservation International (CI), an international
nonprofit conservation group, bought $650,000 of Bolivia's bank
debt from the secondary market at approximately eighty-five per-
cent of its face value.5 6 In return, the agreement requires the Boliv-
ian government to: (1) protect, through legislative initiative, the
334,200-acre Beni Biosphere Reserve, the adjoining 877,205-acre
Yacuma Regional Park and Cordebeni Water Basin, and an addi-
tional 2,870,561-acre Chimanes Forest Reserve, as a buffer zone for
sustained development and use; and (2) establish an operational
fund of an amount equivalent to $250,000 for the management and
protection of the biosphere reserve. 57 The agreement designates CI
to provide continuing technical, financial, and management assist-
ance to Bolivia in connection with these protected areas. 58
B. Costa Rica
The Costa Rican swap involved the conversion of $5.4 million of
conservation and sustainable management of biosphere reserves; (2) debt reduction; and (3)
portfolio improvement for creditors through partial loan repayment. Note, supra note 3, at
152.
54. See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED DEBT-FOR-NATURE
SWAPS TO DATE (1991) [hereinafter THE NATURE CONSERVANCY] (listing all debt-for-nature
swaps as ofJanuary, 1991).
55. See Comment, supra note 37, at 565 (recognizing that Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa
Rica were among first to complete debt-for-nature swaps and that first swap with Bolivia
served as model for swaps in Ecuador, Costa Rica, Madagascar, and Philippines).
56. Agreement between the Government of Bolivia and Conservation International
(available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.), July 13, 1987 (hereinafter Bo-
livia-CI Agreement]; The Bolivia Case (available from National Wildlife Federation, Washing-
ton, D.C.) (undated); THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 54.
Conservation International, the coordinator of the swap, is a nonprofit organization based
in Washington, D.C., which is committed to global preservation of natural diversity. CONSER-
VATION INTERNATIONAL NEWS PRESS RELEASE (available from Conservation International,
Washington, D.C.), July 13, 1987, at 1.
57. Bolivia-Cl Agreement, supra note 56, at 4-5; The Bolivia Case, supra note 56.
58. See Bolivia Sets Precedent with First Ever "Debt-for-Nature" Swap, Conservation Interna-
tional News Release (available.from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.), July 16,
1987, at 1 (stating Conservation International is official advisor to Bolivian government in
design and planning of protected areas); Bolivia-Cl Agreement, supra note 56, at 1 (explaining
Conservation International is scientific and technical advisor to Bolivian government on con-
servation and resource management issues); Truell, What Sone Monkeys Have To Do with the Debt
Crisis, Wall St. J.,Jan. 20, 1988, at A2, col. 1 (stating Conservation International will function
as advisor on development in region).
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Costa Rican debt.5 9 In 1987, the National Parks Foundation
purchased this debt for $918,000 and exchanged it for Costa Rican
currency bonds at seventy-five percent of the face value.60 The pro-
ceeds established a Costa Rican National Resources Conservation
Fund.61 The Guanacaste National Park project was of major impor-
tance to this swap.62 The project involved the purchase of land to
which the government only received title after the park was fully
completed and endowed. 63 Even though the Costa Rican govern-
ment agreed to abide by the conditions of the swap, the land is kept
from its control until all the conditions of the swap are met."4
C. Ecuador
In a complex agreement signed on December 14, 1987, World
Wildlife Fund arranged to purchase $1 million in Ecuadorah debt
for $354,000.65 The debt was converted to nine-year local currency
bonds, with the interest payable to Fundacion Natura, a leading
Ecuadoran conservation organization. 66 Fundacion Natura used the
funds to finance a broad range of conservation activities in Ecua-
dor's national parks. 67 In return, the Ecuadoran government
agreed to preserve land and implement land management plans
which include acquiring small nature preserves, training environ-
mental personnel, and conducting broader environmental educa-
tion activities. 68
III. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS AND SOVEREIGNTY INFRINGEMENT
Supporters argue that debt-for-nature swaps, by avoiding foreign
ownership of land, provide a better alternative to debt-equity
59. Costa Rican Debt-for-Nature Agreement (available from World Wildlife Fund, Wash-
ington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1987, at 2 (establishing Natural Resources Conservation Fund to ad-
minister proceeds from debt-for-nature swap); The Costa Rican Case (available from National
Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.) (undated) (summarizing 1987 debt-for-nature swap in
Costa Rica).
60. Costa Rican Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note 59, at 2; The Costa Rican Case,
supra note 59; THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, supra note 54.
61. Costa Rican Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note 59, at 2; The Costa Rican Case,
supra note 59.
62. See The Costa Rican Case, supra note 59 (discussing project).
63. The Costa Rican Case, supra note 59.
64. The Costa Rican Case, supra note 59.
65. Debt-for-Nature Agreement, World Wildlife Fund-U.S. and Fundacion Natura (avail-
able from World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 14, 1987 [hereinafter Debt-for-Na-
ture Agreement].
66. Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note 65.
67. Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note 65.
68. Ecuadoran Debt-for-Nature Swap, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND TERM SHEET (available from
World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.).
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swaps. 69 Although debt-for-nature swaps do not directly result in
external dominance through foreign ownership, the problem of for-
eign control remains.70 For example, because international organi-
zations supervise the use of funds and act as official advisors for
environmental programs, they implicitly exert control over DC par-
ties.7 1 Thus, it can be argued that debt-for-nature swaps do not
avoid sovereignty problems; but simply mask them by avoiding ex-
press foreign land control. 72
In its most basic sense, sovereignty means independence from all
authority except that imposed by international law.7 3 Sovereignty
rights may rest on legal grounds, but with respect to debt-for-nature
swaps, sovereignty rights rest on moral grounds.74 Indeed, DCs'
69. See Note, supra note 3, at 152 (contrasting debt-for-nature swaps and debt-equity
swaps); The Bolivia Case, supra note 56 (stating that sovereignty issues and accusations of for-
eign intervention are essentially avoided with debt-for-nature swaps).
70. Comment, supra note 1, at 1080 (stating that advantages and disadvantages of debt-
equity swaps should be kept in mind because debt-for-nature swaps and debt-equity swaps
function similarly).
71. See Caldwell, supra note 14, at E2857 (explaining that even though nature organiza-
tions do not own preserved land, they are integrally involved in its preservation, "an issue that
is perceived as an internal affair"); see also Note, supra note 3, at 156 (recognizing that Conser-
vation International's role as advisor serves as controlling mechanism for enforcement); Bar-
ton, supra note 14, at 63 (stating outside agency established Bolivian debt-for-nature swap
budget).
72. See, e.g., Bolivia-CI Agreement, supra note 56 (making no explicit reference to Con-
servation International's controlling preserved land); Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note
65 (making no explicit reference to World Wildlife Fund's control of preserved land); Costa
Rican Debt-for-Nature Agreement, supra note 59 (making no reference to World Wildlife
Fund control of preserved land).
73. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 81, 289 (3d ed. 1979)
(stating sovereignty represents countries' legal personality within context of other countries).
74. See infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty on moral grounds, as
opposed to legal grounds).
Two possible types of legal sovereignty could apply to debt-for-nature swaps: sovereignty
over natural resources as expressed through United Nations resolutions, and sovereignty
against industrialized countries' use of coercive action to influence DC action. A body of rules
governing the exercise of national sovereignty over world legal regimes has developed from
international law. Frownfelter, The International Component of Texas Water Law, 18 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 481, 495-96 (1986) (describing framework and fundamentals of international law and its
applicability to Texas' water resources). The starting point rests in the proposition that sover-
eignty is based on territorial rights. Id. at 496-97. International law utilizes the territorial
sovereignty concept to afford a country the right to access its natural resources and to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the development and utilization of these resources. Id.; see Comment,
Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western and Third World Perspectives in International Law, 26
How. L.J. 1547, 1560 (1983) (declaring countries have right to permanent sovereignty over
their own natural resources). See generally Banerjee, The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources-An Analysis, 8 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 515, 515-25 (1968) (discussing history and
extent of country's sovereign right of control over natural resources).
Human rights debates at the United Nations in the 1950s first made reference to the con-
cept of sovereignty of a country's natural resources. See id. at 515 (reporting that doctrine
originated during Eighth Session of Human Rights Commission in 1952 while Commission
was preparing International Covenants on Human Rights). A 1952 United Nations resolution
first defined the permanent sovereignty concept, stating that DCs have the right to freely
utilize their natural resources and that this utilization may occur to better their economic
positions. G.A. Res. 523, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
498 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:485
primary opposition to debt-for-nature swaps is based on moral prin-
ciples. 75 Debt-for-nature swaps infringe on the sovereignty rights of
Another resolution in the same year recognized peoples' inherent sovereignty rights to freely
use and exploit their natural wealth and resources. G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
20) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
Subsequent resolutions further recognized the permanent sovereignty concept. In 1966
the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that developing coun-
tries "should undertake themselves the exploitation and marketing of their natural resources
so that they may exercise their freedom of choice in the various fields related to the utilization
of natural resources .. " G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at para. 6, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). The resolution reaffirms the "inalienable right of all countries to exer-
cise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources." Id at para. 7. In 1969 the U.N.
General Assembly still recognized that the primary responsibility for DC development rests
on the countries themselves. G.A. Res. 2571, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at para. 8, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969). On May 1, 1974, the U.N. General Assembly affirmed that the new
international economic social order should be founded on full sovereignty of every country
over its natural resources. G.A. Res. 3202, 6 U.N. GAOR (6th Spec. Sess.) Supp. (No. 1) at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). It further held that, to promote cooperation among DCs, each
country must be given the right to protect its inalienable right to permanent sovereignty over
its natural resources. Id. It also held that industrialized countries should make every effort to
prevent encroachment on sovereignty over natural resources. Id. The 29th General Assem-
bly meeting established that every state "has and shall freely exercise full permanent sover-
eignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, nitural resources, and
economic activities." G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.31) at art. 2, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Another possible type of legal sovereignty is a nation's right to be free from economic
coercion. Industrialized countries often coerce DCs by threatening either to withdraw some
economic benefit or to not provide some economic benefit. Farer, Political and Economic Coer-
don in Coniemporasy International Law, 79 AM.J. Irr'L L. 405, 405 (1985) (discussing threats used
in diplomatic relations). Carol Barton, a member of the Center for Concern, contends that
coercion regarding debt-for-nature swaps is blatant because DCs have no choice but to par-
ticipate in these swaps. Barton, supra note 14, at 64.
Coercion occurs because countries have no legal obligation to give economic aid to other
countries and thus may choose not to provide such aid. Farer, supra, at 405. Consequently,
many countries freely employ such threats in diplomatic relations. Id. at 406 (stating there are
many situations whereby governments use coercive diplomacy). There is nothing, however,
illegal about economic coercion. Id. at 406. Many situations exist in international relations
where countries utilize economic threats that are never legally questioned. \For example, the
United States often coerces DCs to join agreements preventing competitie products from
entering the United States by threatening to erect high tariffs for certain DC exports to the
United States. Id. at 406. Also, organizations such as the International Monetary Fund only
lend money to DCs if they agree to strict conditions inhibiting national discretion on matters
important to the DC. Id. Economic coercion is a reality in today's international political sys-
tem. Id. at 405. The legitimacy of this coercion is difficult to challenge, however, because
DCs usually agree to coercive terms. Cody, supra note 14, at 22.
International organizations, of course, cannot arrange these swaps without the participation
and consent of DC governments. Id. at 23. At a minimum, DC governments' finance minis-
ters must approve the discounts at which DCs will redeem the debt, how much of the debt
DCs will honor, and what financial instrument DCs will use. Id. Furthermore, the agreements
require DC organizations to implement and monitor environmental programs. Id. Because
control over natural resources explicitly remains within the DCs, it is also unlikely that inter-
national courts will find that international organizations infringe upon DCs' sovereignty over
their natural resources.
75. Cody, supra note 14, at 22 (stating that Center of Concern, Overseas Development
Council, and Department of Crisis Network criticize debt-for-nature swaps on moral and ethi-
cal grounds). For example, DCs believe debt-for-nature swaps infringe upon their sover-
eignty because they interfere with DCs' internal affairs. Barton, supra note 14, at 64. DCs
further believe that debt-for-nature swaps threaten local sovereignty because foreign organi-
zations choose debt reduction options that satisfy foreign, not domestic, interests. See id.
1992] DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 499
two groups-DC indigenous groups and DC governments. Two
swaps, the Bolivian and Brazilian transactions, epitomize, respec-
tively, these sovereignty transgressions. 76
A. Sovereignty Infringement on DC Indigenous Groups
Negotiations for debt-for-nature swaps usually involve four major
parties: the international conservation organization, the DC conser-
vation organization, the DC government, and the creditor bank.77
One interest group, however, is conspicuously ignored. Indigenous
groups are not included in the debt-for-nature swap process. 78 Be-
cause the homelands and ways of life of indigenous groups are
threatened by deforestation, they too have a stake in conservation
efforts and are important parties to debt-for-nature swap transac-
tions. The Bolivian debt-for-nature swap exemplifies indigenous
peoples' discontent with debt-for-nature swaps. 79
Several sovereignty problems arose from the Bolivian transac-
tion.80 First, before consummating the debt-for-nature arrange-
ment, CI did not consult local residents or organizations regarding
the cultural ramifications of foreign involvement.8 1 At the time, Bo-
livia's indigenous population was struggling to obtain title to the
land involved in the transaction. Title provided the only tangible
evidence of their rights to the territory.8 2 This put the indigenous
people in conflict with a conservation program which, in effect,
(stating debt swaps infringe on DC sovereignty because international organizations, rather
than DC citizens, create development plans). They claim that debt swaps enable international
organizations to set agendas that decide not only how to spend resources but also who may
spend them. Id. Finally, DCs claim debt-for-nature swaps exploit their financial weaknesses
and take needed financial resources away from other government programs. 2 SWAPS, THE
NEWSLETTER OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (available from Intrados Group, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 1989, at 8.
76. See 4 BOLIVIA BULL. (available from Bolivian Embassy, Washington, D.C.), 1988, at 1
[hereinafter BOLIVIA BULL.] (reviewing CI debt-for-nature swap with Bolivia); 135 CONG. REC.
S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (stating that Brazil perceives for-
eign intervention in Amazon as challenge to sovereignty).
77. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 6-7. Other parties to these swaps may include industrial
companies and various nongovernmental organizations. Id. These nongovernmental organi-
zations, however, play only a peripheral role in negotiations. Id. at 8.
78. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 8-10.
79. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (reviewing details of Bolivian swap).
80. Burton, supra note 16, at 241.
81. BOLIVIA BULL., supra note 76, at 1; see Collett, Bolivia Blazes a Trail ... to Where?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, July 10, 1989, at 4 (stating that CI did not consult with estimated
25,000 Indians who lived in and around Chimanes forest before debt-for-nature swap took
place). The Indians are concerned that roads built for loggers will attract settlers who in turn
will raze the forest and use it for farmland. Id.
82. Barton & Burand, supra note 17. at 13; see Collett, supra note 81, at 4 (discussing
Moxo Indians' desire to gain title to 500,000 acres of land). The Moxos believe gaining title is
the only way they can protect their interest in the Chimanes. They perceive an inextricable
link between the forests' survival and their own. Id.
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divested them of their rights to the land. Second, the new environ-
mental programs restricted the indigenous peoples' way of life be-
cause the programs condemned many indigenous activities as
detrimental to forest preservation.83 Consequently, C's involve-
ment created tensions between CI and local indigenous groups. 84
Despite the Bolivian government's consent to the arrangement,
indigenous populations accused CI of interfering with Bolivia's right
to control its land.8 5 Local critics felt the conservation group
treated the indigenous people as birds or trees-they were to be
preserved, but nothing more.86 Bolivia's indigenous people consist-
ently expressed their view that sovereign nations should be allowed
to solve their own problems.8 7
Few environmentalists addressed the sovereignty problems at-
tending the Bolivian debt-for-nature swap.88 Indeed, many simply
dismissed the indigenous peoples' sovereignty concerns.8 9 As a re-
sult, one commentator concluded that the fatal political flaw in debt-
83. See Collett, supra note 81, at 4 (voicing concern that debt-for-nature swaps can alien-
ate indigenous groups by restricting use of trees in preserved territories); see also Burton, supra
note 16, at 241, 242 n.63 (recognizing that local indigenous groups depend on forest for fuel
and food and that Chimanes' future is unsettled because debt-for-nature swap agreement
threatens group's way of life); Allman, The Preservation Paradox, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
Apr. 25, 1988, at 53 (imploring environmentalists not to ignore indigenous groups when im-
plementing conservation programs). Those living off the land may face catastrophic food and
housing shortages if their access to the forests is restricted or denied. Id.
Conservation International officials state they want to integrate the Indians into mainstream
society, but they have yet to act toward this end. Collett, supra note 81, at 4. Indeed, meas-
ures for continuing subsidies for rangers are necessary to keep the indigenous people from
scavenging for food on the reserves. Copeland, supra note 6, at 45.
84. Burton, supra note 16, at 241.
85. Burton, supra note 16, at 241-42. A sovereign's right to control its natural resources
has long been established in international law. See supra note 74 (explaining that countries
have right under principles of sovereignty to use their natural resources freely).
86. Burand & Barton, supra note 17, at 13 (stating that organizations ignore indigenous
groups' complaints regarding debt-for-nature swaps). For example, organizations are insensi-
tive to indigenous peoples' desires to claim legal title to preserved land. Id.
87. Beebe & Stroh, Using Debt To Save Nature, N.Y. Times,July 28, 1987, at A23, col. 2; see
Collett, supra note 81, at 4 (quoting Moxo Indians as saying that because they live in forest,
they can solve its ecological problems better than foreigners); Burand & Barton, supra note
17, at 13 (stating that local conservation movements for environmental improvements should
be supported over foreign movements); Caldwell, supra note 14, at E2857 (explaining that
land preservation is internal affair); cf Comment, supra note 37, at 569 (indicating that gov-
ernment's concern over sovereignty infringement may eventually yield to demands for natural
resources).
88. See Burton, supra note 16, at 242 (stating that despite problems associated with Boliv-
ian debt-for-nature swap, environmentalists continue to ignore DC sovereignty concerns).
89. Burton, supra note 16, at 242. For example, one author states that commentators
express little regard for traditional sovereign concerns when attempting to justify interna-
tional interference in Brazil. Id. The author explains, for example, that one commentator
implies that developing countries are unable to protect their own resources. Id. The com-
mentator charged that Brazil's environmental organizations' assessment that Brazil can take
care of its own problems is "optimistic." Id. The commentator not only ignores the sover-
eign concerns of prominent state environmentalists, but also treats national sovereignty as
nothing more than an obstacle to the protection of the forest. Id.
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for-nature swaps is that environmentalists attach greater significance
to their own moral agendas than to the laws of other countries. 90
B. Sovereignty Infringement on DC Governments
Fears of "eco-colonialism," the fear that industrialized countries
seek to control DCs politically, pervade DC governments.9' DCs
fear that debt servicing techniques such as debt-for-nature swaps
jeopardize their progress toward democracy. 92 They argue that
since industrialized countries exploit their own natural resources for
economic gain, developing DCs' should not be precluded from do-
ing the same.93 Yet despite DCs' insistence on maintaining sover-
eign control over swapped land, recent swaps have not set aside any
new territory for exclusive DC use.94 Debt-for-nature negotiations
with Brazil illustrate the politically controversial nature of these
transactions.
Deforestation in the Amazon Basin is a problem of global propor-
tion. 95 The Amazon forest is the world's largest tropical moist for-
est with more than one hundred inches of annual rain fall and more
species of plants and animals than anywhere else on earth.96
Humans, however, have destroyed more than forty percent of the
Amazon.97 At this rate, the Brazilian rain forest will most likely van-
ish by the end of the century. 98 In an attempt to save this vast re-
source, negotiations are currently taking place for a debt-for-nature
swap between Brazil and CI.99 Brazil's government, however, is ex-
tremely sensitive to foreign involvement in the Amazon and this
90. See Burton, supra note 16, at 242-43 (explaining that environmentalists inappropri-
ately deemphasize sovereignty concerns).
91. Bramble, External Debt, supra note 2, at 2; see Note, Promoting International Environmental
Protections Through Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL IN'L LJ. 65, 66 (1991) (as-
serting that restrictions imposed upon DCs amount to "environmental imperialism" and ar-
guing that treaties are best method of securing worldwide environmental protections).
92. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 16.
93. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 16.
94. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 11.
95. Bramble, External Debt, supra note 2, at 3;see 135 CONG. REC. S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (predicting deforestation in Amazon will have profound
effects on entire world). The area known as the "Classic Amazon" is 3.5 million square kilo-
meters and constitutes 40%6 of Brazil's territory. Comment, supra note 37, at 538.
96. Comment, supra note 37, at 539; see 135 CONG. REC. S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Chafee) (recognizing that Brazil's rain forest produces 18% of world's
fresh river water and is home for nearly one-third of all plant and animal species). One hec-
tare of forest can contain up to 230 different species of trees, whereas a comparable area of
temperate forest might contain only 10 or 15 species. Comment, supra note 37, at 539.
97. Comment, supra note 37, at 540 (estimating that deforestation in Brazil accounted for
two-thirds of total tropical moist forest destruction in 1970s).
98. Comment, supra note 37, at 540.
99. Comment, supra note 1, at 339. Negotiations for debt-for-nature swaps have been
initiated with several Latin American and Caribbean nations, including Peru and Jamaica. Id.
Swaps have already been concluded in Zambia and Madagascar and potential exists for future
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concern stands at the forefront of negotiations. 00 Former Presi-
dent of Brazil, Jose Sarney, while in office, forcefully rejected debt-
for-nature swaps in Brazil, stating that such conditional aid is unac-
ceptable.' 0 ' He vehemently guarded Brazil's sovereignty over the
Amazon, stating, "[The] Amazon is ours... [a]fter all, it is situated
in our territory. '"102
The same concerns over national sovereignty also permeate the
present Brazilian government. For example, Brazil's current con-
sul-general in Vancouver stated that debt-for-nature swaps will not
be accepted because they threaten national control over natural re-
sources. 03 Additionally, the newly-elected Governor of Amazonas
won on a platform of vehement opposition to foreign environmental
protection schemes.' 0 4
Also, prominent member of the Brazilian Congress, environ-
swaps with other African nations. Id; see Copeland, supra note 6, at 45 (stating World Bank is
considering lending Brazil $100 million for forest conservation).
100. See 135 CONG. REc. 53776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (statement by Sen. Chafec) (stat-
ing, in support of SJ. Res. 101, that Brazil perceives debt-for-nature swaps as infringement on
sovereignty and is averse to foreign intrusion in Amazon); see also Comment, supra note 37, at
568 (explaining that Brazil's particular sensitivity to foreign influence requires some atten-
tion); Brazilian Environmentalist Urges U.S. To Halt Threats On Amazonian Deforestation, 12 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 180 (Apr. 12, 1989) (stating that Brazil's sovereignty is "touchy
issue"). But see 135 CONG. REC. S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee)
(indicating that despite Brazil's perception that foreign intervention threatens its sovereignty,
Brazilian authorities implicitly acknowledge that they need assistance solving country's eco-
nomic and social problems).
In the past, Brazil resisted domestic environmental movements. Comment, supra note 37,
at 553. Environmental laws established in the 1940s lacked the support of organizations who
were to implement them. Id. Further, with the advent of military rule and the increased pres-
sure for rapid economic growth, laws to protect the environment were given very little back-
ing. Id. at 554. For example, a March 1967 law created an environmental pollution control
organization, but was revoked within months by a less environmentally protective law. Id.
Brazil generally resists internationally sponsored conservation programs, perceiving them as
plots by rich countries to keep poor countries from developing. Id. In short, Brazil is not
likely to invest many financial or political resources to protect, from exploitation, the same
rain forest that represents the country's greatest potential for development and economic
enrichment. Id. at 559.
101. See Robinson, Brazil Angrily Unveils Planfor theAmazon, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1989, at Al,
col. 1 (quoting Sarney as saying that restrictions on Brazil's use of Amazonian resources
would only abet "that most abject of all pollutions,.the pollution of poverty"). But cf Environ-
mental StringsJustifiable As Condition fir Foreign Aid, Senator Says, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6,
at 320 (June 14, 1989) (stating that giving monetary aid pursuant to land use arrangements is
appropriate tactic to influence environmental policies).
102. Robinson, supra note 101, at Al, col. 1.
103. Id.; see Amazon Rainforest Problems Distorted by Exaggerated Reports, Official Says, 13 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 173 (Apr. 11, 1990) (stating opposition to debt-for-nature swap
with Brazil is too strong to overcome).
104. See Brooke, Ecologists'Foe to Become Amazon Governor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, at 19,
col. I (quoting Governor-elect as stating that 10 million people cannot die of hunger so that
animals and trees may be saved). The Governor, who has been elected three times since
1959, has recently proposed a law that transfers control of the environment from the Brazilian
government to the states and allows "all and any economic use of the Amazon's resources."
Preston, Amazon Resisting Environmentalists, Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1991, at A15, col. 5.
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mentalist Fabio Feldman, stated that because of the sovereignty is-
sue, DC governments will not accept debt-for-nature
arrangements.10 5 He urged countries to donate money to Brazil's
internal environmental efforts instead. 10 6 Feldman stated that the
United States, rather than imposing its own environmental agenda,
should demonstrate support for Brazilians who are pushing for en-
vironmental policy changes.' 0 7 According to Feldman, the United
States' insistence on implementing debt-for-nature swaps threatens
Brazil's sovereign right to decide how to use its own natural re-
sources.108 It is well established that Brazil strongly resists foreign
encroachment upon the Amazon.' 0 9 One commentator explained
that most people in Brazil "were raised since babyhood to think the
rest of the world is trying to steal the Amazon from Brazil." 110 Con-
sequently, if a future swap with Brazil is to occur, transactions must
address and resolve such sensitive sovereignty issues."'
IV. DC AVERSION TO RESTRICTIVE DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP TERMS
DCs frequently react negatively to debt-for-nature swaps and con-
sistently respond adversely to restrictive measures. For example, CI
and Bolivia did not include enforcement provisions in their debt-
for-nature swap agreement, in part because of Bolivia's reluctance
to accept such terms.1"2 Had CI demanded enforcement terms, Bo-
livia might have rejected the agreement, thereby jeopardizing CI's
environmental objectives. 113 Instead, CI opted to employ indirect
enforcement terms which allowed CI extensive involvement in
105. See Robinson, supra note 101, at Al, col. I (reporting that Brazil's government re-
buked international community for attempting to implement debt-for-nature swaps as these
swaps tell governments how to utilize their land).
106. See Brazilian Environmentalist Urges U.S. To Halt Threats on Amazonian Deforestation, supra
note 100, at 180 (stating that if foreign organizations support Brazilian conservation efforts,
then measures benefitting DCs are more likely to emerge).
107. See Brazilian Environmentalist Urges U.S. To Halt Threats on Amazonian Deforestation, supra
note 100, at 180 (stating that United States Congress should stop threatening Brazil with
environmental sanctions and instead should support Brazilian environmental policies).
108. Brazilian Environmentalist Urges U.S. To Halt Threats on Amazonian Deforestation, supra
note 100, at 180; see supra notes 74-75 (discussing DCs' right to natural resources within their
territories). But see Environmental Strings Justifiable As Condition for Foreign Aid, Senator Says, supra
note 101, at 320 (stating that United States is spending own money in DCs and thus has
absolute right to decide how funds will be used).
109. Robinson, supra note 101, at Al, col.1.
110. Preston, supra note 104, at AI5, col. 4.
111. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (emphasizing that sovereignty issues serve
as obstacles to future debt-for-nature swaps).
112. Note, supra note 3, at 156 (suggesting that enforcement provisions may have been
intentionally overlooked or explicitly rejected).
113. Note, supra note 3, at 156.
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structuring the debt-for-nature swap." 14
DCs also resist stabilization clauses. 1 5 These clauses work to
protect agreements from unilateral modification or termination by
contracting countries and are perceived by DCs as draconian limita-
tions on contractual rights. 1 6 Thus, because provisions such as sta-
bilization clauses often make debt-for-nature swaps appear
restrictive, DCs predictably perceive the swaps as threats to their
national sovereignty. 17
V. PROPOSAL
The United States Government encourages all international orga-
nizations to recognize the sovereign authority of DCs' indigenous
groups and governments, and to convey in all debt-for-nature swap
proceedings respect for this authority.118 In an effort to adhere to
the United States Government's recommendations to resolve ten-
sions, this Comment suggests integrating indigenous groups into
the basic debt-for-nature swap scheme. This would attempt to alle-
viate perceptions of exploitation and neglect. Also in adherence to
the Government's recommendations, this Comment further pro-
poses including a sovereignty protection clause in debt-for-nature
swap agreements. The clause would serve to allay DC governments'
fears that debt-for-nature swaps result in their losing control over
their land.
A. Resolving Sovereignty Conflicts with Indigenous Groups
Most indigenous groups are not well-organized and, conse-
quently, do not have their interests effectively represented in debt-
for-nature swap negotiations. 1 9 As a result, they cannot negotiate
114. See Note, supra note 3, at 156 (stating that such subtle form of enforcement was prob-
ably most effective technique possible).
115. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV. INT'L LJ. 317,
355-61 (1988); Archaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 179, 192 (1978).
116. See Curtis, supra note 115, at 346-47 (stating stabilization clauses require both parties
to execute contract in good faith, thereby precluding unilateral termination); id. at 347 (differ-
entiating between various types of stabilization clauses and noting that these clauses infringe
upon sovereignty by limiting actions to those stipulated in contract). DCs assert that the in-
ternational legal principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources also prevents use
of stabilization clauses. Id. at 357.
117. See Curtis, supra note 115, at 359-60 (noting historical presumption of unfairness and
unequal bargaining power between DCs and industrial nations). But see id. at 360 (stating that
although DCs are clearly disadvantaged by stabilization clauses, this does not mean they
should not be used).
118. See SJ. 101, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S3777 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989)
(proposing that United States' foreign policy should recognize Brazil's sovereign authority in
Amazon Basin and condemn future international intervention in area).
119. See Dawkins, supra note 7, at 9-10 (stating that some indigenous groups arc well-
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for swaps that adequately address their interests and concerns. To
resolve this problem, debt-for-nature agreements should integrate
the interests of indigenous populations with the goals of environ-
mental protection. Clearly, the successful implementation of debt-
for-nature swaps depends on the integration of all interested par-
ties.' 20 Because indigenous people, whose interests are directly af-
fected by conservation plans, can contribute significantly to
program development, efforts to include them in debt-for-nature
swaps should be made.' 2 '
The proposed swaps would be analogous to debt-for-develop-
ment swaps, which use local currency obtained to improve the social
welfare of developing countries.' 22 The proposed debt-for-nature
swap, however, would direct funds to environmental research and
education projects for indigenous groups, rather than to general so-
cial welfare programs. The mechanism would work as follows. The
international organization would use its funds to buy DC debt from
the secondary marketplace. It would then sell this debt to the DC
for partial or full face value of the debt in local currency. The inter-
national organization would direct the local currency to local envi-
ronmental aid programs involving the indigenous group, rather
than directly to nature conservation efforts.' 23
Similar programs currently exist. The United States Agency for
International Development's (USAID) debt-for-nature swap with
the Philippines uses indigenous people as park rangers in wildlife
protection efforts. 124 USAID also signed a debt-for-nature swap
agreement with Madagascar which directs funds toward education
programs for the country's indigenous people.' 25 Similarly, a debt-
for-nature swap agreement between CI and Mexico has funds
marked for conservation research stations and education
organized and interact well with white society, while others are not well-organized and have
never had contact with white society).
120. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 10.
121. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 10.
122. See Note, supra note 91, at 67 (explaining that debt-for-development transactions
restructure existing debt to ease capital flight and allow for reinvestment that benefits DCs
and environment). In December 1988, Britain's Midland Bank pioneered debt-for-develop-
ment swaps by donating its $800 million Sudan debt to the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF). West German Bank Swaps Sudanese Debt for Development, The Reuter Library Report
(NEXIS Omni file), June 14, 1989.
123. Burton, supra note 16, at 234-35. For example, UNICEF spends $3 million annually
in Mexico to run its debt-for-development program. Id. UNICEF buys $3 million of Mexican
debt at a discount from commercial creditor banks, then resells the debt notes to Mexico for a
prearranged amount. Id.
124. USAID, World Wildlife Fund Sign New Philippine Debt-for-Nature Swap, PR Newswire As-
sociation, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1.
125. U.S. Aid, Madagascar Complete Deal to Swap Debt Relief for Conservation, 12 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 407 (Aug. 9, 1989).
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Predictably, the indigenous groups involved in these recent trans-
actions have not expressed sovereignty concerns.' 27 At the very
least, swaps integrating indigenous people enhance the ability of or-
ganizations to operate programs that make those who are impacted
most directly their primary concern.' 28 Accordingly, if debt-for-na-
ture swaps follow the proposed format of devoting funds to social
and educational programs, then the complaint most often voiced by
indigenous groups-that their interests are ignored in conservation
programs-would be directly addressed and resolved. By training
indigenous groups in environmental protection efforts and by capi-
talizing on the indigenous populations' knowledge of forest re-
sources that they have accumulated over generations, the proposed
debt-for-nature swap not only would fully involve indigenous popu-
lations but also would allow for more sustainable environmental
development. 29
The sustainable development concept promotes methods of man-
aging natural resources that preserve those resources for future
generations, instead of utilizing methods that have only short-term
value.' 30 As debt-for-nature swaps currently stand, international
environmental organizations simply form nature reserves while ig-
noring sustainable development ideas and, therefore, larger social
concerns.' 3 ' These organizations do not address the roots of envi-
126. Money Raised by Debt-for-Nature Swap to be Used to Preserve Mexican Rainforest, 14 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 107 (Feb. 27, 1991).
127. See Burton, supra note 16, at 255-56 (noting that DCs are concerned with inflation,
loan financing, and interest rates, but did not mention sovereignty).
128. Burton, supra note 16, at 243. The Agency for International Development's support
of various debt exchange programs in its "Debt-for-Development Initiative" suggests the
popularity of debt-for-development swaps. Meuchner, US Funding LDC Debt Purchases on Secon-
dary Market, INsTrrImONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 20, 1989, at 1. Mexico agreed to a debt-for-devel-
opment swap although the country has usually resisted traditional debt-for-nature swaps due
to territorial sovereignty concerns. Burton, supra note 16, at 234-35. Debt-for-development
swaps appear to be more successful than debt-for-nature swaps. For example, of$132 million
converted in debt swaps, $26 million went toward debt-for-nature swaps while $106 million
was allocated toward debt-for-development swaps. Kelash, Development Swaps Said to Top $132
Million, AMERCAN BANKER, May 8, 1990, at 12.
129. See Moran, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. E1264 (explaining that
indigenous population suffers worst from deforestation because they lose homeland, but hu-
manity also suffers because it loses valuable knowledge of indigenous people). The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) assists countries in achieving
sustainable development by strengthening their aid institutions and by improving their own
environmental protection and management programs. OECD Oficials Callfor Integration of En-
vironmenta Developmental Projects, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 81 (Feb. 13, 1991). The
OECD Directorate attempts to provide guidelines for aid agencies that focus on environmen-
tal problems, such as chemical management and population resettlement. Id.
130. See supra note 44 (defining sustainable development concept).
131. See Note, supra note 91, at 88 (suggesting that international organizations should
focus on indigenous production activities, rather than site-specific nature reserves, to achieve
sustainable development).
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ronmental degradation, but merely attempt to employ immediate
gratification-type measures. 132 This undermines the very forces that
can bring about environmentally sustainable development-the in-
digenous peoples themselves.' 33 Under the proposed modified
debt-for-nature swap, international environmental organizations
would not simply educate indigenous populations regarding the
monetary value of the environment or teach them agricultural meth-
ods that produce only short-term benefits. Instead, indigenous
populations would be taught less environmentally destructive and
more agriculturally productive subsistence techniques.' 3 4 Rather
than repressing environmental degradation through inspections or
fines, conservation organizations would eliminate the motivations
for this degradation.' 35 By educating and training the indigenous
people, the modified debt-for-nature swap considers the long-term
effects of environmental development by promoting long-term be-
havioral modification.' 3 6 In short, if environmental organizations
were to use their funds to develop educational and environmentally-
conscious social programs, indigenous people would learn to "take
care and maintain the ecology because [they] know that it guaran-
tees [their] existence."' 3 7
To aid in this process, the indigenous people of Brazil have devel-
oped an organization, the Coordinating Body of the Amazon Basin
(COICA), which represents the interests of the indigenous popula-
tion and attempts to integrate the indigenous people in all negotia-
tions regarding the Amazon rain forest.' 38 Pursuant to these efforts,
COICA has offered to conduct research, train paralegals, and man-
age parks and reserves.139 COICA maintains that because Brazil's
indigenous people reside in conservation areas, they can efficiently
monitor debt-for-nature swap agreements and better assist in their
132. Burand & Barton, supra note 17, at 13.
133. Burand & Barton, supra note 17, at 13.
134. See Burand & Barton, supra note 17, at 13 (calling for education of indigenous people
about debt perpetuation and environmental destruction).
135. New President Appoints Ecologist to Head Environmental Secretariat, 13 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 152 (Apr. 11, 1990) (arguing that ecological reform measures such as large
taxes and fines do not repress deforestation activities).
136. Commentators criticize debt-for-nature swaps because they do not address the big
picture, and thereby serve only as a "stopgap solution to larger, more fundamental
problems." Crosby, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: An Eco-Panacea?, The Guardian, Apr. 25, 1990, at
3, col. 1.
137. Collett, supra note 81, at 4 (quoting letter from Moxo leaders to minister of Indian
affairs).
138. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 9. COICA believes that indigenous control of economic
activities within their territories is integral to the security of indigenous peoples and the Ama-
zonian forest. Id.
139. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 9.
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B. Resolving Sovereignty Conflicts with DC Governments
While efforts promoting participation of local indigenous groups
is vital for the success and legitimacy of future debt-for-nature trans-
actions, simultaneous efforts affording DC governments an in-
creased degree of control in debt-for-nature swaps should also be
made. 14 1 Efforts providing DC governments with unfettered con-
trol over their natural resources is essential for the future success of
debt-for-nature swaps. 142 Accordingly, a sovereignty protection
clause should be included in every debt-for-nature swap. The clause
would permit a DC government to seek damages if an environmen-
tal organization infringes on its sovereign rights, thereby reinforc-
ing DC national control over its natural resources. Through
negotiations, both parties would previously agree on what acts
would violate DC sovereignty rights.
The sovereignty protection clause concept is -derived from the
concept of nationalization. 43 This section of the Comment will dis-
cuss the concept of nationalization and the international legal doc-
trines that legitimize nationalization of privately-held land. Next,
this section will address the issue of what damages should be owed
to DCs when sovereignty protection clauses are breached. Although
it is difficult to accurately measure the amount of money owed to a
DC when a foreign entity exerts control over the DC's resources, the
damages paid to property owners when a country nationalizes, or
takes property, is an appropriate gauge. Finally, this section at-
tempts to predict and counter criticisms of this sovereignty protec-
tion clause.
1. Nationalization generally
Nationalization is defined as a government's "taking" or re-
claiming of its domestic natural resources for purposes of social or
economic reform.' 44 A government's right to nationalize an inves-
140. Dawkins, supra note 7, at 10.
141. See Dawkins, supra note 7, at 18 (stating that with regard to sovereignty there is in-
creasing degree of national control exercised by DC governments).
142. See Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting Environmental Interests
in Developing Nations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1065, 1080 (1989) (stating that tension between DCs'
interest in control and environmental groups' interest in enforceable agreements must be
resolved).
143. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing nationalization concept).
144. Rood, Compensation for Takeovers in Africa, 11J. INT'L L. & ECON. 521, 524 n.5 (1977);
see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 517 (2d ed. 1973) (referring to
expropriation as taking of foreign corporations' private property for certain public purposes
and nationalization as expropriation of major national resources on a general program of
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tor's property for some public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner, is generally recognized throughout the world. 145 The concept
derives from a country's right to maintain permanent sovereignty
over its natural resources.146 Political resentment of foreign domi-
nation is a factor that DCs consider when determining whether to
nationalize property.1 47 Consequently, because DCs often national-
ize to free themselves from foreign control, it is logical to base dam-
ages for sovereignty invasion on the damages standards of
social and economic reform); cf. Comment, supra note 74, at 1548 n.4 (quoting Francioni,
Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 INrr'L
CoMP. L.Q. 263, 267 (1975) (defining "nationalization" as transfer of land by legislative act
for assignment to private individuals to fulfill governmental interests)).
A nationalization only occurs for purposes of economic and social reform. See Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at
15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) (providing that nationalization, expropriation, or requisitioning
shall occur for reasons of public utility, security, or national domestic and foreign interests).
Nationalization is different from expropriation. "Expropriation" is the taking of property by
the government for its own private use while "nationalization" is the taking of natural re-
sources by government as a part of social or economic reform. Rood, supra, at 524 n.5.
Although countries recognize nationalizations, controversy exists as to what constitutes an
effective taking for purposes of awarding damages. Comment, supra note 74, at 1549. Funda-
mental differences in political ideologies and systems of property ownership and distribution
foster conflicting views in this area of international law. See id (contrasting Western society,
which maintains privately and publicly held property and weighs individual rights against
state's interest, with African states, which generally adhere to principles of communal land
rights).
Takings can be of private property. See id. at 1547 (discussing takings of foreign-owned
private property for social or economic purposes). Takings also can be of leased property.
See generally D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 398 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D. Del. 1975) (stating that
nationalization decree issued by government includes interests acquired or leased);
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1600, 1605 n.28 (1988) (discussing expropria-
tion of leaseholds and estate of years in regulatory takings cases). Nationalizations can even
be of slavery. When a slave was brought into a free state, the slave could be declared a free
citizen by the state. See generally Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon The Constitution: Federal-
State Relations In Scott v. Sanford, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 192, 193-206 (1990) (discussing nation-
alization of slavery and the role of federalism).
145. See Comment, supra note 74, at 1548 (noting that United States and DCs recognize
countries' rights to take property for public purpose); Rood, supra note 144, at 528 (recogniz-
ing that countries agree that nationalizations are lawful). The Argentinian, Mexican, and
United States Constitutions provide clauses holding that no person may deprive another of
property. Comment, supra note 74, at 1548 n.5. For example, article 17 of the Argentinian
Constitution provides that "[p]roperty is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the Nation can be
deprived thereof except by virtue ofjudgment founded in law." See id. at 1548 n.5 (quoting
Argentinian Constitution).
146. See Banerjee, supra note 74, at 529 (stating that countries feel that sovereignty over
their own resources is obvious); Comment, supra note 74, at 1560-68 (discussing legal con-
cepts underlying nationalizations and detailing historical development of concept of perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources); supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text
(reviewing struggle of DCs to achieve permanent sovereignty over their natural resources).
147. Rood, supra note 144, at 521-22. Professor Rood cites other factors such as DCs'
need for greater wealth and power and their ability to obtain foreign property within their
own borders. Id. at 521. Other reasons, however, may include a previous DC government's
failure to appreciate fully the ramifications of a foreign project or investment until after its
implementation. Comment, supra note 74, at 1553 n.23. In such circumstances, the agree-
ment may prove unacceptable to a subsequent government having different economic and
developmental aspirations. Id. Thus, the subsequent government will nationalize the land
involved in the project. Id.
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2. Legal doctrines legitimizing nationalization
One doctrine legitimizing nationalization is the act of state doc-
trine, a statement of respect for territorial sovereignty.149 The lead-
ing case formulating the act of state doctrine is Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino.' 50 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that countries must respect the independence of every
other country and that courts of one country must not sit in judg-
ment of another country's activities within its own territory. 151 The
rationale for this doctrine is that courts should abstain from actions
which hinder the conduct of the United States executive branch in
foreign relations and which imperil amicable relations between the
United States and other foreign countries. 152
Another doctrine legitimizing nationalization is the Calvo doc-
trine. 153 This doctrine, originally adhered to by Latin American
148. See Comment, supra note 74, at 1553 (stating that majority of nationalization cases
involve DCs' desire to be free from foreign control); id. at 1552 (discussing Canada's national-
ization programs which reduced foreign ownership of oil and gas).
149. Harfield, Book Review, 18 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 1015, 1020 (1986).
150. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The case arose out of the Cuban government's expropriation
of a sugar corporation, a majority of whose shareholders resided in the United States. Id. at
401-06. The Supreme Court held that the judicial branch will not examine the validity of a
foreign sovereign's actions, even if the actions violate international law, absent a treaty or
other clear agreement concerning controlling legal principles. Id. at 428.
For other cases that address the act of state doctrine, see generally United States v. Bank of
N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 466 (1936) (holding that decrees of foreign government are
worthy of extraterritorial effect because such decrees are consistent with United States law
and public policy); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) (stating that
act of state doctrine is based on principles other than international comity); Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (stating traditional formulation of act of state doctrine);
Hudson v. Guester, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 293-94 (1808) (declaring that country must recog-
nize another country's act of sovereign power).
151. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (quoting Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
'There are three instances where the act of state doctrine will not apply. The treaty excep-
tion requires United States courts to reject applying the act of state doctrine when foreign
countries' challenged actions are the subject of a treaty between the United States and the
acting foreign country. Sei Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of
Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing 1953 Treaty of Amity between
United States and Ethiopia justifying rejection of act of state doctrine). Under the Bernstein
exception, United States courts will reject the act of state doctrine when a clear expression of
executive policy directs the courts to pass on the validity of acts of foreign sovereign states'
officials. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that clear expression of executive policy renders appli-
cation of act of state doctrine unnecessary). The commercial activities exception rejects the
act of state doctrine when foreign governments engage in activities in which any private citi-
zen can engage. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704-06 (1976) (hold-
ing that activities of Cuban agents in operation of cigar business for profit was not act of
state).
152. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697 (rejecting argument that adjudication of foreign cases
would not injure United States foreign relations).
153. Carlos Calvo, an Argentine diplomat and legal scholar, originally proposed the doc-
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countries, is often found in clauses in DC constitutions, and in legis-
lation and business contracts in DCs and the United States. 154 The
Calvo doctrine provides that there is absolute equality between na-
tionals and aliens and that determination of the rights of a country's
people is left entirely to the territorial sovereign. 155 Because the act
of state and Calvo doctrines legitimize the nationalization process
under international law, DCs may rightfully appropriate their natu-
ral resources for their own benefit through sovereignty protection
clauses.
3. Damages
The payment of damages for breach of a debt-for-nature sover-
eignty protection clause provides relief to a DC government when
an international environmental organization infringes on its sover-
eignty rights.' 56 The amount of damages paid should be agreed on
during debt-for-nature swap negotiations.
Each debt-for-nature swap is different and thus each will require
its own particular damages provision. The following guidelines,
however, should be utilized when formulating such a provision.
When addressing damages, the issues of requisite standard of pay-
ment and the time-span of payment must be determined. 57
In the event of a nationalization, several damages standards may
be invoked. The first standard is the "fair market value" method of
trine in 1868. See generally C. CALVO, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1988).
154. Comment, supra note 74, at 1574-75.
155. Comment, supra note 74, at 1574. For example, Peru incorporated the Calvo doc-
trine in article 17 of its Constitution which states that all foreign or national companies are
subject to Peruvian laws and all contracts must state that these companies will submit to Peru-
vian laws. Arechaga, supra note 115, at 193 n.45 (citing CoNsTrrUCIrON POLICA (Constitu-
tion), art. 17 (Peru)).
156. Cf Muller, Compensationfor Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue, 19 CoLUM.J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 35, 35 (1981) (stating nationalization compensation usually covers DCs' nationaliza-
tion of foreign industries established within DCs); see supra note 44 and accompanying text
(defining conservation easements).
157. Muller, supra note 156, at 39. Other factors to consider in determining compensa-
tion include the currency or modality (e.g., DC government bonds, the foreign countries'
currency, or the DCs' currency) in which compensation is paid and the "deductions" claimed
by DCs. Id "Deductions" are claims made by DCs regarding special circumstances which
justify reducing the compensation paid to the foreign country. lId at 50. Special circum-
stances include excess profits incurred by the foreign investor, costs of building housing for
company personnel, and disparities in value of minerals. l Another question may be
whether or not there is an obligation to pay compensation at all for nationalizations. Com-
ment, supra note 74, at 1555. Western industrialized states promote a standard of protection
in which there is always a duty to compensate. Id. But see Rood, supra note 144, at 528-29
(stating that even though United States advocates compensation for all nationalizations,
United States has not, in past, recompensed for nationalizations of enemy property during
wartime, slaves during abolition period, property subject to police powers, securities through
devaluation, and wealth by high taxation).
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recovery.158 Fair market value would be the amount at which the
DC can sell the nature reserve in the open market. 59 The second
measure is to value the property as a "going concern." 16 0 This is a
profit-based standard calculated by multiplying either the past an-
nual earnings, or estimated future earnings, by a capitalization fac-
tor.16 1 This measure is inapplicable to debt-for-nature swaps
because there are no future profits to calculate. The third measure
is to provide "replacement costs" of the forfeited project. 16 2 This
award would be equivalent to the price at which DCs must pay to
reestablish a similar project elsewhere.' 63 The final approach is to
award the "book value" of the project.16 4 This approach would
measure the value of the land before conservation begins. 16 5
Once DCs and foreign organizations determine the appropriate
damages standard, they must next determine the timing for pay-
ment of damages. Multinational corporations of the United States
and other western countries promote "prompt" and "effective"
compensation for a nationalization. 166 Generally, these corpora-
tions desire damages paid in stable currency within ten years of the
breach. 6 7 DCs, however, prefer to pay foreign corporations based
on their capacity to pay without detriment to their social or eco-
158. Note, International Parties, Breach of Contract, and Recovery of Future Profits, 15 HoFSTRA
L. REv. 323, 327 (1987). For example, if a country nationalizes a United States corporation,
the corporation's assets are assessed at fair market value and the corporation is made "whole"
by receiving complete recovery. Id at 327. The model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides
that compensation should be equivalent to fair market value of the investment. Comment,
supra note 74, at 1569.
159. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.93 (defining fair market value as amount injured
party would pay for property if selling in open market).
160. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.93. For example, if a country nationalized a cor-
poration, the going concern would be computed by multiplying a profit figure for an agreed
upon year or number of years by another agreed upon figure to determine the corporation's
investment value. Id. at 1569.
161. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.93. This measure does not provide complete
recovery like fair market value does, but it does provide recovery for loss of certain in-
tangibles, such as future profits and good will. Muller, supra note 156, at 40.
162. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569. For example, if a country nationalized a corpora-
tion, the compensation cost is the amount the corporation would have to pay to replace its
fixed assets. Muller, supra note 156, at 40.
163. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.93. This amount would cover costs including
new facilities and equipment. Note, supra note 158, at 327.
164. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.93. "Book value" is computed by subtracting the
total liabilities of a corporation from its total assets. Muller, supra note 156, at 40.
165. Comment, supra note 74, at 1569 n.94; Muller, supra note 156, at 42-45; Note, supra
note 158, at 328.
166. Comment, supra note 74, at 1555; Muller, supra note 156, at 47. This standard is
known as the Hull rule. Comment, supra note 74, at 1555 n.31. In 1938, Secretary of State
Hull wrote a letter to the Mexican government requiring them to pay prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation for nationalizing several American oil industries. See Note, supra note
158, at 329 (stating that Hull charged Mexico with deviating from international law insofar as
this law requires prompt and effective compensation).
167. Muller, supra note 156, at 47.
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nomic progress.' 68
In an effort to resolve the issues of the damages standard, one
commentator suggests that DC domestic law should govern since
international environmental organizations voluntarily invest their
environmental protection funds in that country. 169 There is, how-
ever, no controlling international legal norm for a damages stan-
dard and, therefore, any reasonable standard agreed on by the
parties involved may prove legally acceptable. 170
4. Criticisms of sovereignty protection clauses
Several criticisms of sovereignty protection clauses can be postu-
lated. One potential criticism is that the clauses allow DCs to bring
a claim for damages by simply asserting that international environ-
mental organizations are infringing on their sovereignty. As a re-
sult, these organizations may fear that DCs will make false
accusations and, therefore, may be deterred from investing in DCs.
International organizations and DCs, however, can negotiate and
decide which acts will violate DCs' sovereign authority. Accord-
ingly, such negotiation will foster mutually acceptable agreements
and thereby ensure that future international investments in DCs will
not suffer.' 7 '
Another possible criticism of sovereignty clauses emanates from
international organizations' fear that the clauses lack international
legal status, thereby enabling DCs to indiscriminately demand dam-
ages through application of their own domestic law.' 7 2 Article 2 of
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, however,
maintains that all countries have an obligation to fulfill, in good
faith, any agreements freely entered into and to abide by all provi-
sions contained in those agreements.' 73 Any breach of this Charter
168. Comment, supra note 74, at 1555-56.
169. See Comment, supra note 74, at 1576-77 (stating multinational corporations volunta-
rily venturing abroad should be subject to DC laws since they are receiving benefits from
those countries).
170. See Comment, supra note 74, at 1576 (noting there are fundamental differences be-
tween countries' opinions on compensation issue); Muller, supra note 156, at 35 (maintaining
there is lack of mutual understanding between international investors and DCs); Note, supra
note 158, at 328 (stating there is "clear dichotomy" on views of compensation).
171. See Note, supra note 158, at 329 n.44 (reasoning that negotiations will secure future
international investments because communications between parties to contract increase likeli-
hood that contractual terms will be honored, thereby satisfying reasonable expectation of
parties).
172. See generally Ar~chaga, supra note 115, at 189-95 (discussing controversial legal status
of international investment agreements).
173. U.N.G.A. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). The proposition that all agreements between DCs
and foreign countries must be implemented in good faith and that dispute settlement proce-
dures must be respected was further supported by a United Nations Assembly resolution. See
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would permit recovery by the international organization in accord-
ance with article 2, paragraph 2(c) of the Charter. 174
Because carefully constructed agreements can remedy DCs' sov-
ereignty concerns, debt-for-nature swap agreements should incor-
porate a sovereignty protection clause. The proposed clause would
allay DCs' "ecological-imperialism" anxieties by providing DCs with
some recourse if environmental organizations do not abide by the
written debt-for-nature swap agreement. 175 Explicit provisions in
debt-for-nature swap agreements addressing DC sovereignty con-
cerns afford these issues the reverence they deserve.
CONCLUSION
In their present form, it is unlikely that debt-for-nature swaps will
significantly alleviate the international debt and environmental cri-
ses. Debtor countries and their indigenous populations perceive
debt-for-nature swaps as an affront to their sovereignty and there-
fore are reluctant to enter into such transactions. Accordingly, if
future debt-for-nature swaps are to succeed, international organiza-
tions must address and allay these fears of sovereignty infringement.
Even if these fears are misguided or unjustified, as Senator John
Chafee has suggested, perception is often more powerful than real-
ity and must be taken seriously-even if we disagree with that
perception.' 76
Debt-for-nature swaps are a noble effort to resolve the dual crises
of massive environmental degradation and catastrophic debt bur-
dens. It is well recognized that plans which attempt to remedy both
crises, such as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1990,
are a practical necessity not only to development of debtor countries
but also to efforts to protect our planet's resources.1 77 Debt-for-
G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) (placing
agreements between country and foreign company on essentially equal terms with intrastate
agreements).
174. See Ar6chaga, supra note 115, at 191 (characterizing breach as expropriation of inter-
national company's contractual rights which requires DCs to pay compensation). Article 2,
paragraph 2(c) provides that controversies regarding compensation be settled not by domes-
tic law, but by the means agreed upon by the DC and foreign country if the means are "freely
and mutually agreed" upon. U.N.G.A. 3281 Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (Nqo.
31) at 50, U.N. Doec. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M., supra note 173, at 251.
175. See Bramble, External Debt, supra note 2, at 2 (noting DC concern that investor coun-
tries are more concerned with global warming and species extinction than with DCs' social
and economic problems).
176. 135 CONG. REC. S3776 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (discuss-
ing Brazil's perceived threat to sovereignty stemming from proposed debt-for-nature swap
regarding Amazon).
177. Note, supra note 91, at 95; see Comment, supra note 37, at 537 (stating that because of
Brazil's sensitivity to its sovereignty, financial incentives involving foreign funding devoted to
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nature swaps benefit the debtor by reducing international debt. By
promoting environmental programs, conservation groups and the
entire world benefit as well. A plan addressing both the debt and
environmental crises, however, must recognize and accommodate
the interests of all parties involved. The sovereignty infringement
problems which exist in present debt-for-nature swaps belie the ulti-
mate goals of debt-for-nature swaps. Because DC sovereignty fears
exist on the forefront of debt-for-nature swaps, the future develop-
ment of successful transactions will depend on the resolution of
these important sovereignty concerns. The world's future genera-
tions, whose existence and sustenance depends on the habitability
of our global environment, deserve no less.
preserving and maintaining forest reserves, "appear to be the most appropriate mechanism
for protecting the forest") (quoting Laurent Fabius, former Prime Minister of France).
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